Change Gov Mechanism to Mitigate Last-Minute Voting in DAO
Proposal Details
Description
**ABSTRACT** This proposal aims to introduce a new voting mechanism to address the issue of last-minute voting in the Decentraland DAO. The objective is to ensure more reflective and fair governance decisions. **POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS** *1. Randomized Proposal Voting End Time* Implement a randomized closure period toward the end of the established proposal’s voting timeframe. The exact closing moment of the DAO proposal will not be known to voters but will occur randomly within a predetermined percentage of the closing phase of the proposal voting period. This specific percentage and the parameters for randomness will be determined based on community feedback. *2. Extension of the Voting Period* Extend the standard proposal voting period if significant voting activity occurs in the final hours or minutes. This extension will be triggered if the vote margin changes by more than a predefined percentage (to be determined through community input) within the last 24 hours. This allows stakeholders more time to evaluate and react to late swings in voting outcomes. **VOTING OPTIONS** YES: Change Governance Mechanism. NO: Leave as it is. This is a non-binding pre-proposal poll to assess community sentiment. If approved, feedback and insights will be solicited to refine and finalize the points.
Voting Rationale
not bad ideal
Everyone should feel free to vote whenever. Adding such measures will only result in more confusion & more complexity to already complex DAO
Change Gov Mechanism to Mitigate Last-Minute Voting in DAO This proposal has been PASSED by a DAO Committee Member (0xfb1afa4dc069ffb47b19dbee196045d508fcd5a2)
Change Gov Mechanism to Mitigate Last-Minute Voting in DAO This proposal is now in status: FINISHED. Voting Results: * Yes 52% 5,104,124 VP (36 votes) * No 47% 4,712,819 VP (15 votes) * Invalid question/options 1% 58,681 VP (8 votes)
Thank you all for your feedback. As to feasibility, I saw Snapshot has feature requests. I left one. [https://snapshot.canny.io/feature-requests/p/add-options-to-to-mitigate-last-minute-votings](https://snapshot.canny.io/feature-requests/p/add-options-to-to-mitigate-last-minute-votings)
Another mechanism we could take is what Nouns DAO does with dynamic voting thresholds...  I still like the idea of VP reduction over time, I feel is simpler for the community to understand and for the voter to be aware of.
Answered yesterday on Discord, pasting here for the record Even though the ideas are good, the ethos behind off-chain voting with on-chain reference is the concept of the snapshot (Concept that Snapshot, the tool we use for gasless voting takes advantage of). The idea behind Snapshot is that it takes a picture of the blockchain status at the momentof the proposal creation. By doing that, ensures that VP is not modified during the proposal duration. For that to happen, the voting period needs to be written at the proposal creation moment. Maybe there is something we could to to obfuscate the ending time in the Governance dApp and define that randomly at the moment of the creation using a logic voted by the community, but in Snapshot and elsewhere it will be visible, therefore, is not super effective. In addition to the technical feasability, this goes against the movement other DAOs are doing to reduce voting fatigue by setting specific days of the week for proposals creation. See for example [Arbitrum](https://snapshot.org/#/arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0x5c0cecde14ec0b83c954b47c2d79348ce249019b83894f3938fc80b45e1232da), and [Optimism](https://community.optimism.io/docs/governance/token-house-history/)
point 2 looks like an intelligent solution for me, great work @web3nit. Can have variations but I think it's a really good idea.
Good question. Need someone from Gov Squad to chim in. Hi @ginoct, could you please help with answer ? > Otherwise, even a broken clock is right sometimes, well done. :grin:
Does snapshot support this? my understanding is snapshot would need to support something like this. Otherwise, even a broken clock is right sometimes, well done.
**1. Randomized Proposal Voting End Time** **Example**: Suppose the community agrees to implement a randomized closure within the last 20% of a 14-day voting period. This 20% translates to approximately 3 days. Therefore, the randomized closure could happen at any time during days 12 to 14 of the voting period. Voters would not know exactly when within this window the voting will close, encouraging them to cast their votes earlier rather than risking missing out if they wait until what they assume to be the last moment. **2. Extension of the Voting Period** **Example**: Imagine on the 14th day—the final scheduled day of voting—a surge in votes occurs, resulting in a total vote count that increases by more than the predefined trigger of 10%(for instance). To accommodate this significant last-minute participation and allow time for all stakeholders to respond, the voting period could extended by an additional day(or other period defined by DAO).
9 Comments