@toxicwaifu poses good questions here now that the council has been elected https://forum.decentraland.org/t/next-steps-for-the-dao-council/23679/2

maybe, behind the scenes, so the 'right' people can be picked ;)

It's been two weeks since this passed. Anyone working on getting this started?

[quote="dao, post:1, topic:23282"] **Compensation:** * Council members will be compensated 1,000 USD per month payable in MANA for their responsibilities and commitment. [/quote] If you really thing $1000/month is going to get you any kind of _quality governance_, you are sorely mistaken. [https://letmegooglethat.com/?q=councils+face+corruption+risks](https://letmegooglethat.com/?q=councils+face+corruption+risks)

Proposal for Establishing a Council for Decentraland DAO This proposal is now in status: PASSED. Voting Results: * Yes 94% 12,682,623 VP (26 votes) * No 5% 681,411 VP (14 votes) * Abstain 1% 266 VP (2 votes)

> 0x7f8317150beb1b7670bee39f5750f113d4b2d61a writes > [StarVote#d61a](https://decentraland.org/governance/profile/?address=0x7f8317150beb1b7670bee39f5750f113d4b2d61a) voted "Yes" with 8.51M VP,2 hours ago Even though I don't agree with the selection process, I think we need to move forward fast This is just not the way to reason about a voting process ! If you do not agree with the selection process, you must request the Proposal be rewritten !

Example of a Proposal that could simply have had its deadline extended: Draft: https://decentraland.org/governance/proposal/?id=dd5bf7c0-efe3-11ed-813c-b353c3943eab Governance: https://decentraland.org/governance/proposal/?id=19e40b90-3b1d-11ee-9496-2daa447e4bf3 + https://decentraland.org/governance/proposal/?id=4abbfc20-f7d2-11ed-8e4f-8db7948b5171 Here's another one, which had to undergo a re-submission before finally being accepted: Draft: https://decentraland.org/governance/proposal/?id=a44efb60-7d62-11ed-8456-a323c09ee17e Governance: https://decentraland.org/governance/proposal/?id=108f6b70-8fc4-11ed-aae5-394e6c1c2226 + https://decentraland.org/governance/proposal/?id=bb921ab0-abdd-11ed-8dfe-4ff0ad4dfd32

You should absolutely care if alternative solutions haven't been tried first. There are serious misconceptions about VP Delegation which need to be clarified. Also the logistics of the Thresholds hasn't been tinkered with enough, which should be the obvious next step. Perhaps a dynamic Threshold based on participation should be considered. Or perhaps Stalled proposals can just be extended until enough VP has voted. And maybe, at the same time, 50% is too low, perhaps 2/3 of the majority should be required for Governance votes, this could have prevented the passing of e.g. https://decentraland.org/governance/proposal/?id=99c66b90-e2d2-11ec-9000-175d8dd584b8. It is really too drastic of a "fix" to be moving away from decentralization.

I don't care if development is more centralized if the team will be productive and effectively reaching goals and results. I don't feel having control over the Bitcoin protocol but I still have ownership of my cryptos, the same thing for my MANA and my LAND and my NAME/world... but please, do a fucking good work or at least try your best so that our assets are worthy on a good platform and enriched ecosystem (for whoever that will be working in this new org) 🙏 🕯️

[quote="dao, post:1, topic:23282"] The Council will consist of **5 doxxed members** [/quote] To begin with, "Doxing" is the act of revealing personal information about someone online without their consent. The use of this term in a Governance context is hardly appropriate. [quote="ginoct, post:1, topic:23030"] The current governance model of the Decentraland DAO requires VP holders to vote on every proposal [/quote] This is just not true. VP holders who wish to not participate in DAO proceedings can simply Delegate their VP. VP holders who received delegated VP but also do not wish to not participate in DAO proceedings, should be able to simply re-delegate this VP. VP is not a kind of "honor point system". VP is not a "reward" to be awarded to "those you feel deserve it" ! VP a "decision power" force. There should be no issue seeing one's VP re-delegated to someone who is trusted by this person _in whom you trust_. Total control still remains if VP can be un-delegated in all cases. [quote="dao, post:1, topic:23282"] Council members will be compensated 1,000 USD per month payable in MANA for their responsibilities and commitment. [/quote] This sounds like the beginnings of a [Bloated Government](https://fee.org/articles/whats-so-bad-about-big-government-anyway). [quote="dao, post:1, topic:23282"] the DAO needs to delegate operational oversight to an Executive Arm [/quote] VP holders can Delegate their VP, which if done properly, should be able to generate this kind of Executive body all the same, while preserving the decentralization the DAO currently has. <hr> There are a few issues with the current VP system which make it hard for this "decision power" to properly coagulate. I suggest we try to fix those first, before rushing to a solution as drastic as the creation of a Council. Making it possible to re-delegate VP is one of them I shall endeavor in forthcoming posts to clearly describe all the fixes that I have in mind.

There should be nothing to fear about the concentration of VP that is made in a _decentralized way_. On the other hand, there is much to fear from the concentration of decision power that comes under the form of any kind of Council.

I agree. I fully doxxed when I was hired by the Foundation for the Ambassador Coordinator position, knowing that this was a requirement for this job, as they needed W-9's, etc. to stay compliant. I was able to request that my "Canessa" alias was used, and it was. The DAO is different than Foundation. One concern I would have for residents of the US is how responsible you could be if federal guidelines around the liability of DAO's changed. I know this caused US citizens to withdraw their applications to work for the DAO Committee, as there are grave implications if you are the sole US citizen legally connected to a DAO (in case of a lawsuit). :cold_face: Would being a Council member mean you have this same level of liability? This would be worth knowing a very clear and concise answer before anyone takes this job.

Although the new structure seems coherent and necessary, I abstain from voting because the proposal does not specify that D&O (Directors and Officers) insurance will be hired, something essential to support the security of the members of the council. This type of insurance protects members of the council against lawsuits related to decisions made in their role, covering legal expenses and compensation for errors or negligence, but excluding illegal acts. What I am going to discuss is extremely important and should be read carefully: **Being a member of the council can lead to severe consequences if the organization does not hire adequate D&O insurance for its top management.** <br> **Fiduciary, legal and criminal responsibility** Council members have the obligation to act in the best interest of the company, this includes the duty of diligence (making informed decisions) and the duty of loyalty (avoiding conflicts of interest). If at any point members are found to have failed to meet these responsibilities, they could face legal consequences, such as fines, lawsuits, or even criminal penalties in serious cases. Council members could be held liable if they make financial decisions without understanding the underlying risks, so if the company faces serious financial problems (something that seems likely when the vesting contract ends), they could find themselves legally and financially involved. In certain cases, council members can be held liable for the company's debts if it becomes insolvent and appropriate measures are not taken, and they may be forced to take on the financial burden. In situations of mismanagement or negligence, they could be held liable to financially compensate the company or harmed third parties. For example, if the price of MANA plummets and it is believed that they have not taken measures to protect the interests of stakeholders. **Regulatory compliance** Council members must ensure that the company complies with all legal and regulatory standards. Failure to do so could lead to regulatory investigations by members that are not only uncomfortable, but can also result in sanctions for the members. A clear example of risk would be implementing ideas such as Decentraland acquiring DG (suggested in a recent Discord conversation), which although may be interesting ideas have too many legal issues for the council members to assume personal responsibility, even more complex in the crypto industry, which has many legal loopholes, ambiguities and significant risks. **D&O insurance benefits** Protection against indirect lawsuits: In some situations, the company itself could face lawsuits if the directors are not adequately covered and act defensively to protect themselves. Good D&O insurance reduces the risk of these problems affecting operations. Bankruptcy: Protecting council members if the company becomes insolvent due to a fall in the price of MANA making financial commitments impossible. Investor class action: Covering potential costs and compensation if shareholders sue the company and its directors for significant loss of value in their investments, again, for example, from a sharp fall in the price of MANA. Regulatory fines: This would cover penalties for failing to comply with regulations, which could otherwise be claimed from council members.

It also tells hackers who to target.. There will be a financial reward for successfully targeting them.. Where as true anon would be almost impossible to attack.. but thats not going to work for a social job..

I feel like "doxxed" is a spectrum If I have no interaction with you, and neither does the community, then the level of doxxing should be higher then someone like a Canessa, or an Awedjob who have been active and engaged in countless spaces and given us, as a community, a chance to get to know them as an individual.

In regard to the issue of Doxing, if someone is funded by DAO then we should know who they are. Especially in this role, trust is essential and how can we truly trust someone who will be paid without knowing who that person is? Voting NO but somehow, I think that 8.5M VP will vote this in no matter the opinion of us little guys...

One of my friends from the polkadot ecosystem doxxed himself for a $500 a month crypto job. One month later he went missing. I started to google who he was and he had school relationships with a lot of early bitcoin millionaires.. So yhhhhh dont dox yourself.. Crypto is anon for a reason..

Hello, while I support the concept of an executive committee, my concern is that ultimately, one individual from the foundation has control over DAO decisions and funds, as approved here: [Proposal for Establishing a Council for Decentraland DAO](https://decentraland.org/governance/proposal/?id=911115a8-8c0b-4408-be38-7a10366a2e25) The proposal states that council members will be elected and dismissed through VP voting, which is intended to ensure community control and enable more efficient and professional governance. However, new members will essentially be elected and approved by a single person holding 8.5M VP. For genuine community control over voting, why not distribute that VP among a broader layer of trusted members who have demonstrated their commitment to Decentraland. As someone with 6,266 VP, earned through investment in the belief that I would have a say in this DAO, the implication that my vote doesn’t matter is disappointing and contributes to my further disengagement as a community member. Jenn

This no longer has anything to do with decentralization. Please think about that when you're going to vote (But that was already the case with this ill voting system where those with the most property, i.e. with the most VP, have the most power) Just say. Have a nice day.

Proposal centralizes power by giving significant control to a small group of five council members, leading to reduced community participation. Without clear rules, council members might favor their own interests or those of specific class they represent. All this goes against the DAO’s decentralized nature. Without term limits, these members could remain in power indefinitely like with DAO Committee, reducing accountability and stifling fresh ideas. There’s a lack of clarity on how DAO approved decisions will be enforced and who is responsible for implementing them. This could result in important proposals being ignored or not acted upon. This is a good example: [https://decentraland.org/governance/proposal/?id=4f628ce9-ab7f-4aab-abb2-6f10742164e5](https://decentraland.org/governance/proposal/?id=4f628ce9-ab7f-4aab-abb2-6f10742164e5)

Let's bring up few disadvantage of this proposal: * **Potential Centralization Risks**: Although accountability mechanisms have been introduced, giving the council greater power in management could make some community members feel deprived of their governance participation, reducing their sense of belonging to the project. If issues arise within the council, this could lead to even greater management risks. * **Decrease in Voter Engagement**: While removing voting on daily operational issues reduces voter fatigue, it may also make some members feel distanced. The lack of voting opportunities could make them feel they have less actual influence on the project, leading to a decline in active participation.(actually we need much more active participants) * **Initial Governance Adjustment Challenges**: In the early stages of the council's establishment, there will be a need to define internal rules and decision-making frameworks, which could lead to inefficiencies and management challenges. The roles and responsibilities of the council need to be clearly defined, and it will take an adjustment period, which may negatively affect community trust and support. * **Council Member Representation Issues**: The proposal specifies that council members should represent different fields, but without a reasonable screening and open selection mechanism, council members may fail to represent all community stakeholders, leading to governance imbalances.

There needs to be expiration dates where a vote takes place on whether committee members retain their postion or not. Whether that be 6 months a year or 2 years doesn't matter but I will not vote yes on anything that does not have a term limit.

[quote="dao, post:1, topic:23282"] The Council will consist of **5 doxxed members** [/quote] Doxxed to who? Like would someone, for example, like @Canessa be eligible who is doxxed to many, particularly the foundation and anyone who has attended the live events, but not to me or most of the community? Because I'd be mostly fine with something like that, or would the people applying to make $1000 a month have to subject themselves to being fully doxxed to the entire community? I love the DCL community, but there are some crazy people in this space. Having had one of them use my Linkedin photo as their Twitter pfp while tweeting insane things has left me with a desire to warn anyone considering fully doxxing themselves to this community to maybe reconsider. It certainly doesn't seem like it would be worth $1000.