Call for a Decentraland Incentive system. (Draft Proposal) This proposal is now in status: PASSED. Voting Results: * Yes 75% 2,678,248 VP (33 votes) * No 25% 914,914 VP (9 votes) * Abstain 0% 0 VP (0 votes)

Thank you for the input! As we keep mentioning, this proposal is a start, pilot scheme to align interests. In the future, we plan to have more features related to POP, for example, twitter/discord verification, and eventually something like Galaxy or Gitcoin verification. But, I dont think it is necessary to have those in place in the beginning, when there are not that many participants and rewards. And even if there is a boom of players and exploitation, we then can implement it quickly.

Without decentralized annonymous "Proof Of Personhood" - It would be relatively easy to create multiple fake accounts (Sybil attacks) to accumulate points and unfairly claim rewards Without PoP, it is hard to distinguish between genuine human engagement and bots / AI autonomous agents mimicking active gameplay The proposal includes a referral mechanism where users get 10% of their invitees' points. Without PoP, this could be easily exploited by creating multiple fake accounts to refer each other The current anti-exploitation measure such as requiring a DCL name - are not enough without PoP. Anyone could still create multiple legitimate-looking accounts and buy them names and even run on multiple deviced Without ensuring that rewards are going to unique individuals, this system may end up rewarding a small number of highly active exploiters instead of a diverse community of unique real human users The reliance on a "dedicated team" for moderation, without a PoP system, could lead to centralization and potential bias in reward distribution As the DCL will grow, manually monitoring for exploitation without PoP would become very difficult and resource-intensive Besides if the system is perceived as easily exploitable due to the lack of PoP, it could negatively impact investor confidence Considering Malasya just became first country in the world to integrate PoP into their Digital infrastructure and first social decentralized social media - dscvr.one . Decentraland could became first metaverse if the DAO able to not only keep up study new technologies to the core and adapt in time For now it is unfortunatly a NO from me, altho the proposal is great! By the way IMO it is related to any proposal based on Reward systems to take in consideration since they are failed on default without PoP

Thank you for the feedback Rizk, however, i wanna mention 4 things. 1. Yes, Nifty island Blooms enable users to exchange wearable, but the ultimate goal of players/creators to farm blooms is to get their future Airdrop of token. This is also how they marketing it "Play to Airdrop", and that actually drives the overall trading and economy. Blooms exchanging wearbale is just an extra incentive layer they put on their system, it is a very good economic feature, but not the determinal one. 2. This proposal is a start, and it focus on building the basic elements of the system and balance the interests among creators, players, voters, and the overall interests of DCL and DAO. So it is also possible to let user cliam wearbale with the points they get in scene each month in the future. Again, this is a start, as a start, we aim to be simple and be focused, so that it will be eaiser for the community to comprehend it. (imagine a lot of people still think there should be 0 incentive at all) 3. I think it does not have any confliction with the new client. The incentive system need some time for development and self-testing, so i dont see any reasons why it must go together with the new client. I would even think it can be better if it can start before the new client, so that we can do some debug or have some early feedback before massive promotion. 4. I really think 5% is a very small number , IMO opinion, there should be more to use here, however, we tend to do babystep, and start from this tiney 5% percentage. Plus, I dont understand why we need to reserver the 30% of this 5% when you have the other 95% of the total DAO reservation as fund.

Totally, the creators and players actually dont need that much money to be satisfied, but we are currently facing a none-incnetive environment here in dcl. I believe once they can earn something even if thats small, they will be more incentivised to do things in dcl @BanJarod It does not let me to reply 3 consecutive msgs. so I reply here. I would love to see @yemel @esteban feedback as well. I think we should stop dividing the community , but to unite the community interests. All users, players, creators, voters need to be inentivised, and they are ethical to enjoy it because of their contribution(playing, creating, voting). Plus, without the support from voters, the system would be not sustainable. Big voters can shut it down any time. Besides, we seperate the reward pool into 2 parts, to gurrantee that at least 75% of the incentives still belong to players, creators and referers. You can argue the percentage, but overall, i think its all fair , reasonable and ethical. Especially in WEB3 [quote="BanJarod, post:15, topic:22871"] Perhaps a cap on the amount a person can receive from VP participation would help make this less self-serving. [/quote] However, this might be a good advice, be rememebr, the system can also be adjusted in the future following DAO's decision. So in the start, i tend to be loose and trust they can join without much exploitation. And like I said, this rewards is too small for those large voters to do bad things.

thank you for commenting, we will think about it in the next stage!

I believe that if the new client succeeds, it will naturally attract new users. But more important is developing user friendly tools that make it easy for creators to build games on their Lands or Worlds, similar to what Nifty Island has done if you ever checked, where even a ten years old can create gunfights, flag races... ext, so they made it simple for anyone to deploy games on their 'island,' they offer Bloom prizes that i rememebr can be exchanged for NFTs, which can then be sold on the market. with such thing you can generate revenue through the sale of VIP guns and other power items. This creates a self sustaining ecosystem where players are rewarded to participate in those fights & races and they purchase in-game items causing income for the platforms. A similar approach could be highly effective in Decentraland with the new client, moving beyond just attend events or voting on proposals to earn MANA. Anyway, since the community support this idea, if the government proposal passed would be best to implement Q1, Q2 after the new client release . so that help with marketing too. one more important thing, it might be more suitable to allocate **5%** of the **70%** grant budget for this initiative, leaving the remaining **30%** reserved for the DAO ecosystem and future needs ([Budget allocation](https://decentraland.org/governance/proposal/?id=bfab7b70-7b75-11ed-ad27-015f26e7c35c)). This approach would reduce the two quarterly budget when implementing this proposal, for example here, **Q1 and Q2 of 2024 to 65% instead of 70%,** which mean totalling for six months 388,500 MANA, in other words 64,750 MANA per month for 6 months.

I don't see how a system that rewards High VP holders with more VP can be ethical. The very act of voting for this proposal is self serving. I do hope @esteban dusts off his no-voting account to put a stop to this so that the Dao Regenesis can have a chance to discuss more inclusive ideas. **Edit to add:** Perhaps a cap on the amount a person can receive from VP participation would help make this less self-serving.

I like the thought of spending marketing budget on rewards for active participants, similar to Youtube ad revenue. Could even be pennies incrementally. Like a nice little $20 bonus after a significant amount of effort for those that are really active. So it's not enough for ruggers to take advantage of. And those that end up hodling for mana to go up, will really benefit!

"Temporary support vote yes, but I need you to address two technical issues, both of which I consider extremely important: 1. The referrer's benefit should be prioritized, such as taking 50% of the 75% total, meaning the more referrals they bring, the higher their rewards. 2. How can we reward members who genuinely participate in DAO voting and are familiar with all past proposals? Understanding history is crucial for future development. In simple terms, can we track and reward those who are actively engaged in the DAO, offering them more substantial incentives (e.g., VP + reading proposal time)? Is this feasible?"

First, they need a DCL name for each multi-accounts, and we tend to use dcl metrics standard to check if they are bots or not, and as said above, hope this is sensible to you! [quote="MetaDogeisme, post:10, topic:22871"] And you are right, like what we mentioned in the last proposal, for most games, it is not possible to 100% avoid bad behaviours, but we can control it by putting more cost on the bad actors. So using some code to AFK add the difficulty for exploitation, the requirement for a dcl name add the cost for exploitation. There can be more standards in place in the future as you say, and the system should be kept adjsuting based on the situation time to time. [/quote]

thank you Carl, this will be the start of the scheme, but of course more marketing focus features can be in place, for example, there can be some social task to give users points to encourage further promotion.

We tend to use what DCL metrics is using here to define non-afk player and time. https://www.dcl-metrics.com/scenes  And you are right, like what we mentioned in the last proposal, for most games, it is not possible to 100% avoid bad behaviours, but we can control it by putting more cost on the bad actors. So using some code to AFK add the difficulty for exploitation, the requirement for a dcl name add the cost for exploitation. There can be more standards in place in the future as you say, and the system should be kept adjsuting based on the situation time to time. [quote="Unknower, post:7, topic:22871"] Overall I think this idea is progressing well and am in support of trying something out even if it’s not perfect at first. Launch a few rockets and learn from the explosions, if you will. [/quote] This is so reasonable!

How would the system work for multi-accounts or afk bots?

I find this idea interesting. I do think we need to use some funds to promote Decentraland. I am sure we'll want to do more types of marketing and promotion over time than only what this is proposing, but this proposal is interesting because the amount is conservative, and the 6 month initial limit should give us time to gather ideas about whether it needs improving and how, or shelving.

What would be used to determine if someone is legitimately "not AFK"? It would be fairly easy to run a script that just walks your user around forever while you're not there. I feel like this would quickly dilute the rewards for actual participation. It would also unfortunately add to the dead mall feeling if we see a bunch of people walking around aimlessly like broken NPCs. Overall I think this idea is progressing well and am in support of trying something out even if it's not perfect at first. Launch a few rockets and learn from the explosions, if you will.

@LTC After some thoughts, I think the District VP is not the biggest concern now. First, most of the district VP holder never used their VP to vote even once. There are only a few of them use that power, and for these people, I did not see them pushed a grant proposal themself, so I tend to believe they will not joining with bad faith in this incentives system. Second, the current rewards is too tiny for them to do bad things. It does not worth it to face critism from the community to fight for such amount of money for them. These people are usually whales with huge assets. Last, in the worst case, if they really do exploit the system, the DAO can vote again to restrict them

To be honest it is not a hard tool to develop. what is unclear to you? The tool development need to go through a seperate grant proposal.Anyone can submit their version of proposal with budget, as long as they can realise this mechanism. And the final result of the governance proposal just decide the percentage share of the incentive system and the overal mechanism.

I would prefer to see specific technical solutions that are good enough before going to the governance proposal.

[quote="dao, post:1, topic:22871"] If this poll passes, we will refine the incentive system plan and discuss the execution details, including the technical solution, team, and budget. [/quote] Thanks for the comment, I think that would be discussed in details in the next stage to define the technical feasibility, if you think this overall mechanism works, then feel free to vote yes and see if the technical solution is feasible and sensible in the next stage. (We tend to choose Baby Step and focus on one concern in one proposal, and this proposal is to focus on the overall mechanism. ) BTW it is technically feasible, all of the information described above can be traced. Our DAO traces the voting pattern and is open it to the public. The player/creator record can be tracked as well, for example, DCL metrics along with Atlas Corps is doing that. So what's left is just the points system and reward distribution system needs to be developed in order to enact this proposal.

I think we don't have the right tools to reward players and creators the way they are described in this proposal, the method is too weak.