Should the Community Be the Final Arbiter in Grants Revocation Decisions ?
Proposal Details
Description
SUMMARY This proposal seeks to determine whether the Decentraland Community should have the final say in the revocation of Grants through the DAO governance process, thereby aligning the decision-making process with the principle of decentralization. DESCRIPTION The **[Decentraland DAO](https://docs.decentraland.org/player/general/dao/overview/what-is-the-dao/)** is the decision-making tool for MANA, NAMES and LAND holders in Decentraland’s virtual world. The DAO’s Grants Program is one of the best vehicles to help grow the Decentraland ecosystem and must be aligned with the main spirit of Decentraland - Decentralization. Currently, the revocation of Grants is done by the **[Revocation Committee](https://governance.decentraland.org/proposal/?id=ce104d00-7d94-11ed-8456-a323c09ee17e)**, which may not fully reflect the Community's will. This proposal suggests that while the Revocation Committee should continue to exist and make the initial decision on whether a grant should be revoked, the final decision should rest with the Community, providing a safeguard mechanism to override the Committee's decision if necessary. Grants revocation decisions should not be delegated to a small group of individuals, instead, they should be resolved through the DAO's governance process, which was designed as a legitimate tool to mirror the Community's sentiments. By allowing the Community to override the decisions of the Revocation Committee through the DAO governance process, we can ensure that the Grants Program remains a true reflection of the Community's desires and needs. This proposal emphasizes the existing procedure where the Grant Support Squad and Revocation Committee can initiate a **[preventive pause or revocation](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1VPb33QdeFlg-qnmclWZF2Ll_3USLUnFO/)** of the Grant Vesting Contract when potential concerns are raised. However, this proposal suggests an enhancement to this process: the final decision on the revocation of the Grant Vesting Contract would be subject to the outcome of a Community vote. If the Community vote is in favor of the Grantee and against the revocation, the Grant Vesting Contract won't be revoked. In such a case, any preventive pause that had been initiated would be lifted and the Grant Vesting Contract along with its payments would be continued, and vice versa. VOTING OPTIONS YES: Community should be the Final Arbiter in Grants Revocation Decisions. NO: Leave as it is.
Do you believe censorship is a centralized act? Do you believe censorship is a web3 principle? Sounds like you are contradicting yourself.
I want to align it with the current DAO governance process to help people save time and to ensure they know what to do. This is about having a clear protocol for such situations. My intentions resonate with my [Delegate's vision](https://forum.decentraland.org/t/open-call-for-delegates-apply-now/5840/14) of promoting more decentralization.
Why do you want to undermine a new system recently implemented that has not had a proper chance to work yet? It feels you are not being honest with your motivation
Thanks for remark. If approved, this process would only be activated in cases of disagreement with the Committee's decision not always taking extra time. In my opinion, DAO's involvement should ensure consistency in both grant enactment and revocation when needed.The Revocation Committee will still have an important role in the process, providing expert opinions and recommendations. The proposal aims to ensure that the Community will continue to play a substantive, not just ceremonial, role in the DAO governance process.
Because VP whales might vote to reinstate grants clearly being abused just because they are friends with the grantees. If the revocation committee end up with the decision that the grant is not respecting their promises, then the grant should be revoked, not sent to a community vote. Why have a revocation committee if their decision is not respected?
why to steal more money if the funds are paused?
**WILL BE**? We still have two stages of proposal to go through. I think this proposal would slow down the revocation process and allow bad actors to steal even more money from the DAO.
Should the Community Be the Final Arbiter in Grants Revocation Decisions ? This proposal has been PASSED by a DAO Committee Member (0xbef99f5f55cf7cdb3a70998c57061b7e1386a9b0)
Hey, now there is more than 12 million VP in circulation only delegated by Esteban, so the decisions will be up to the Community.
This Prop is silly, why would we want to leave the decision to revoke grants up to @RobL sounds counter productive to me :joy: :joy:
“Community” or RobL and LandLordDAO. Same difference.  
Should the Community Be the Final Arbiter in Grants Revocation Decisions ? This proposal is now in status: FINISHED. Voting Results: * Yes 55% 5,916,057 VP (38 votes) * No 1% 13,020 VP (14 votes) * Invalid question/options 44% 4,746,309 VP (49 votes)
Seems like you should spend more time working on what the grant you got is paying you to do and less time trying to figure out how to hold onto that grant without actually working on it.
Hi, thanks for your feedback. This proposal aims to streamline the grant revocation process by aligning it with the existing governance process opportunities. This will empower the Community to act more efficiently by envisaging such cases and creating a protocol for them, thereby reducing the time and complexity involved in making these important decisions.
I never agreed with the formation of yet another committee and more money spent on something the GSS was already doing with support from the community. However, we just elected them and I think we should allow this community-wide decision, which took time and arduous work to implement, a chance to function before changing the process yet again. The community already has the ability to revoke a grant by way of the governance process if there is an immediate need to. This would be unnecessary.
Hi Gino, thanks for your feedback. While the Community delegates certain decision-making responsibilities to Squads/Committees with specific expertise to maintain the DAO and move towards achieving its goals and mission, it's also important to remember that the Community plays a crucial role in the [DAO's governance process](https://docs.decentraland.org/player/general/dao/overview/what-is-the-dao/). The DAO has already been involved in the process of enacting grants, so it seems consistent to also involve it in the revocation process when necessary. This doesn't mean that every decision will need to go through a vote, **but rather that the option is there should the need arise**. The number of grants that have been [revoked](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1FoV7TdMTVnqVOZoV4bvVdHWkeu4sMH5JEhp8L0Shjlo/edit#gid=1087165366) is relatively small compared to those funded - 13 out of 178 (≈ 7%). As I mentioned earlier, a Community vote can be activated only if there's disagreement with the Committee's decision, so the extra time needed for the process in these cases would be manageable. This proposal is about ensuring that the Community has a voice in significant decisions, enhancing transparency, and aligning the process with the values of Decentralization. I hope this clarifies the intent behind the proposal. Also, this proposal concerns only the DCL DAO grants revocation process. The Decentraland Foundation is separate from the DAO, and I agree that the [delegation framework](https://governance.decentraland.org/proposal/?id=f33d4c40-a972-11ed-8dfe-4ff0ad4dfd32) should consider certain specifics like time optimization, certain autonomy when dealing with feature development, but I also think that some features should be discussed with the Community. As to original [Decentraland white paper](https://decentraland.org/whitepaper.pdf): > "Unlike other virtual worlds and social networks, Decentraland is not controlled by a centralized organization. There is no single agent with the power to modify the rules of the software, contents of land, economics of the currency, or prevent others from accessing the world."
Thanks for the clarification, Lord. I truly don't think this is necessary. If we need to community-vote everything, why are we delegating decision-making and giving autonomy to teams that have broader context?. With this framework, each feature that DCL Foundation wants to build should go through community voting first, even if we as a community delegated them with the power and responsibility to execute on the product roadmap of the project.
Is this part of your work as the StrategicUnit?

This is a nice conversation by the way. My own opinion is telling me that this kind of power of DAO Committee dishonours the DAO's decision on approving a Grant regardless whether the Grantee is doing it right or wrong. Let the community review again, in tandem with GSS or any other squad, regarding any revocation request before the DAO Committee executes any pause or revocation. If a whale approves a Grant, it's okay because she owns the governance token and voiced only her decision. If you will invalidate her decision, that means you are dishonouring her purpose of holding the governance token. We can make it right by letting them participate on the revocation process before pausing or revoking any given grants. Another way is to tag them (those who voted Yes) to personally participate in the review process. Just my personal opinion mates. I do not intend to change any process.
Decentralized governance does not mean that everyone has to decide on everything. It means (among other things) that the community can easily and in a permissionless fashion give and take back power from representatives, delegates, or organizations making certain decisions. In the case of grants, I do not have time to conduct a thorough review of a questioned project to determine if it should be revoked or not. That's why we elected a committee that can acquire sufficient context and spend time understanding the situation before making an informed decision. The great thing is that if I do not trust the committee or any of its members, I can create a Hiring/Firing proposal and replace their members, or I can initiate the governance process to change the structure or dissolve the committee.
In reality, the Community already has the ability to revoke grants through the DAO governance process, as evidenced by [past precedents](https://forum.decentraland.org/t/dao-35be15c-should-the-community-be-the-final-arbiter-in-grants-revocation-decisions/20062/4). This proposal doesn't seek to undermine the Committee, but rather to ensure the Community's voice in significant decisions and to refine procedures, providing an avenue for disagreement with Committee and establishing a protocol for such situations.

I think this is invalid and could potentially hamper and overcomplicate the community elected system of checks and balances that should be in place for the grant system. It shouldn’t just be based on who can lobby and whale enough votes to pass something through, and a standard should be established with some individuals who are able to help regulate the grants. Sure it’s decentralized, but the decentralized community recently voted this committee and its members in place. They should have more time to work before something like this should even be considered.
Vote could be activated only if there's Community disagreement. This will ensure layer of oversight when needed.
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