Should we implement an incentives system for early voting engagement?
Proposal Details
Description
**EARLY VOTING ENGAGEMENT** This proposal advocates for the implementation of a mechanism within the Decentraland DAO to gradually reduce the weight of Voting Power (VP) used to vote on proposals after the fifth day, decreasing by 5% each subsequent day. The current voting system allows for significant influence from whales or large stakeholders who may only engage in the process towards the end of voting periods. This last-minute influx of VP can skew outcomes and undermine the democratic ideals of the DAO. Gradually reducing VP over the course of the voting period, could help to incentivize early participation and will also bring more predictability, allowing community members to anticipate voting dynamics and participate accordingly, as well as discouraging strategic manipulation of the voting process.
Voting Rationale
i believes there is better solutions
Banning, reducing, limiting, penalizing, and centralizing are not options for me.
Gino, Fehz & Ivey must be really bored :)
Should we implement an incentives system for early voting engagement? This proposal has been REJECTED by a DAO Committee Member (0xfb1afa4dc069ffb47b19dbee196045d508fcd5a2)
Should we implement an incentives system for early voting engagement? This proposal is now in status: FINISHED. Voting Results: * Yes 15% 1,604,179 VP (40 votes) * No 85% 8,764,398 VP (21 votes) * Invalid question/options 0% 0 VP (0 votes)
Imagine active grant recipients feeling pressured to vote "YES" on proposals. Just as active grant members must follow/obey the core units, grantees may feel compelled to support Grant Support Squad proposals out of fear. This proposal above reveals a concerning lack of understanding from the core units about the necessary policies to ensure the DAO's functionality. Also, core units, who are themselves "grantees," are attempting to centralize everything. All new policies seem designed to increase their power and secure their annual share of funds. A thorough investigation of their proposals would likely reveal a centralized scam. People need to become aware of this situation before it's too late.
You're right, this hurts decentralization in same way you and the CartL doing it.
Limitations are a severe violation of decentralization; decentralization should not have restrictions. I believe there are better solutions available.
Yes , because in general this must reduce manipulation at the end of voting and increase community engagement , especially from whales on early days I believe its better to be able to predict an outcome based on early incentivised voting trends , rather then at the end of voting
Not everyone in a DAO receives 100k every year to be present here every day; some people have their own affairs, and some aren't able to stay on track immediately. It doesn't mean they deserve to have their voting power to be nerfed. This is a form of discrimination.
In the near future, individuals may need to purchase a course to comprehend how the voting system operates in Decentraland. Without understanding, they may resort to simplistic solutions such as reducing, banning, or limiting without addressing core issues. This could lead to a cycle of unnecessary complexity with new proposals continually added to appear productive. Future observers may view this situation humorously, questioning the capability of current DAO handlers. #freethedao
This is a cool idea. I also support a penalty for late votes
9 Comments