DAO Committee Deprecation & Replacement
Proposal Details
Description
The DAO Committee historically acted as an operational and governance-enactment body: executing transactions, paying grants, and coordinating treasury operations. With the discontinuation of the grants program and the creation of the DAO Council, the Committee’s scope has significantly diminished. This proposal introduces a transition strategy that retires the DAO Committee in its current form while reassigning execution responsibilities to a hybrid multisig structure composed of trusted representatives from existing entities within the Decentraland ecosystem. **Important note:** After multiple attempts to secure the continuity of one Committee member in the multisig without receiving a response, the DAO Council has initiated conversations with external security providers that offer professional signer services. In parallel, the Council will also evaluate other candidates from the community or the Decentraland ecosystem who are considered suitable for the role. The proposed multisig will consist of trusted representatives from the DAO Council, the Security Advisory Board (SAB), the Decentraland Foundation, and a security specialist or technically capable representative from the Decentraland ecosystem, forming a balanced and technically competent 3-of-5 multisig structure.
Voting Rationale
Rizk already thinks I'm an idiot, so I figure the pros outweigh the cons.
DAO Committee Deprecation & Replacement This proposal is now in status: PASSED. Voting Results: * Yes 89% 11,702,508 VP (50 votes) * No 10% 1,329,866 VP (5 votes) * Abstain 1% 11,194 VP (3 votes)
Rizk, you seem to be very out of the loop of how things work: 1. No, this proposal changes the owners of the [Ethereum Multisig](https://app.safe.global/home?safe=eth:0x89214c8ca9a49e60a3bfa8e00544f384c93719b1) and the [Polygon Multisig](https://app.safe.global/home?safe=matic:0xb08e3e7cc815213304d884c88ca476ebc50eaab2), which hold less than 2M MANA tokens. 2. No, the Treasury is held by the [Aragon Agent](https://etherscan.io/address/0x9a6ebe7e2a7722f8200d0ffb63a1f6406a0d7dce), who is also the beneficiary of the [Vesting](https://etherscan.io/address/0x7a3abf8897f31b56f09c6f69d074a393a905c1ac). The Aragon Agent can be commanded by the SAB only, and there are three people (HP, CEO and former-CTO) who can do withdrawals, with no cap limit, and a 24 hours timelock. This setup has been like this for a long time, and is not changed by this proposal (although I think we SHOULD revisit it soon, because the three signers with unlimited withdrawals is a huge risk). 3. LOL WHAT NOW? No. Only the SAB can command the agent to ~~revoke or~~ change ownership of the vesting contract. The Ethereum or Polygon multisigs are not connected to the Vesting or the agent in any way. **Edit**: I just checked and [the owner of the Vesting](https://etherscan.io/address/0x7a3abf8897f31b56f09c6f69d074a393a905c1ac#readContract#F10) contract [has self-destructed](https://etherscan.io/tx/0x246c3df40b43619bcf22f3817534332a5a8c8000530866742d6b46363f0cea22), so neither the SAB, nor Esteban, not even Vitalik himself can revoke that vesting now. 4. There was a proposal for the [compensation of the Council members](https://decentraland.org/governance/proposal/?id=3a499895-35c7-45fe-ac9e-918e3248fc7b) set at $1k/m. Changing that would require another proposal. The Council members salary come from the [Polygon multsig](https://polygonscan.com/address/0xb08e3e7cc815213304d884c88ca476ebc50eaab2). We propose this multisig to have 5 members, only 2 council members. And the designated operator will have an allowance that limits how much access they have to the funds in that multisig. So “they can pay themselves whatever they want” would need collusion between Council, SAB, Foundation and the 5th signer, which at this point I guess neither you, Tobik or HP will volunteer for. Or if the operator went rogue, it wouldn’t have access to the \~$500k in that multisig because of the allowance cap. OTOH, the current setup is DAO committee pays themselves, using a multisig only they control, and they don’t need to collude with third parties in order to access the $500k in that multisig (let alone the $2.5M in the Ethereum one). I ask you, in the current setup, what stops the DAO Committee from “paying themselves whatever they want” besides “trust me bro”? 5. Are we reading the same proposal? The only payments that the Ethereum and Polygon multisigs will be doing, which are the ones we are talking about modifying in this proposal, are the following: * Paying for Curator fees ([last month about $500](https://etherscan.io/tx/0xc7e937fa1f735cc5bccb1ad016163b25a62bdb44b9d4dd9ab725b33ff3b6b98c)), * Paying Council members comp ([last month $4000](https://polygonscan.com/tx/0x14b60243514dd647c2152b0872e5ff5c8714711c303a83106d7b82f48ca49ced)) * Paying DAO Committee members compensation until deprecation ([last month $7200](https://polygonscan.com/tx/0x275e01fccac6fb9166056f0b376a79a7fc401fcee7f750324eed7518b77a4a93)) * Refill metatxs gas tank (rarely, I couldn’t find a tx in the last year) * Refund Immunify bug bounties, as they are paid by Foundation, and refunded from the DAO ([in the last year there was only one \~$19k refund](https://etherscan.io/tx/0xcbff3631a35981ccc54fa70fa1032eaec7ad49fade0b0dd0be4fca3eb81b7528)) 6. No, in total the [Ethereum](https://app.safe.global/home?safe=eth:0x89214c8ca9a49e60a3bfa8e00544f384c93719b1) + [Polygon](https://app.safe.global/home?safe=matic:0xb08e3e7cc815213304d884c88ca476ebc50eaab2) multisigs hold about $3M in assets at todays prices, which you can check by visiting the links. And to be honest that last point sparks some questions that now I would like to ask you, since we are talking: You were [very concerned about the \~$1M transfer](https://forum.decentraland.org/t/a-note-on-regenesis-labs-funds-management/24577/4?u=monotributista) (in two txs: [one](https://etherscan.io/tx/0x894a87e1c6e25b936e12b9f126f5c95b43ed6088e7abc14f43e9b4d8ffd83d31) and [two](https://etherscan.io/tx/0xe0e61d18ed2dc7d27cfbfbc06ab6f3fd47d0f9917a32872ac39bbbc84b2f891e)) that was done from the [Regensis/Council Multisig](https://app.safe.global/home?safe=eth:0x93AcCD5b8AEE795C6efcfdEDFE4a292e59e00e84) (which was funded by the [Executive Arm proposal](https://decentraland.org/governance/proposal/?id=a3cad5c2-d72f-468d-bbf2-e96f0f8cea7f)) to [Renegesis Operational Multisig](https://app.safe.global/home?safe=eth:0x5613eC65db405FD33613c3620AA8B15BBC888E4B) who holds their budget for their 18 month operation. For that they proposed a budget, [made a projection](https://lookerstudio.google.com/u/0/reporting/cd0ef35b-1802-40d0-b590-1035384c657d/page/p_qgskcd5nvd), was approved and so far they are sticking to it as far as I can tell by checking their [operations on DeBank](https://debank.com/profile/0x5613ec65db405fd33613c3620aa8b15bbc888e4b), since they are public. I’m not arguing that the transparency can still be improved, through reporting and also third party audits, but it’s a start. Part of the concern was the amount being “too high” compared to expenses or that it was too many months in advance, and that the multisig was not properly setup (it had one owner). Both valid concerns, but so far the expenses seem to be around $70-$80k a month, which matches the budget and projections so far. I’ve only seen you paste screenshots of pieces of etherscan transactions and demanding what are they for, not even actual links, and that’s not how reporting or requesting information works. The other concern which I think is very valid, was that the multisig (not a “private wallet”, whatever that means) was not properly setup, since it had only 1 signer. This has been addressed since.  Now, lets review the actual status of the DAO Committee: 1. It currently holds $3M in assets ([Ethereum](https://app.safe.global/home?safe=eth:0x89214c8ca9a49e60a3bfa8e00544f384c93719b1) + [Polygon](https://app.safe.global/home?safe=matic:0xb08e3e7cc815213304d884c88ca476ebc50eaab2)), and since the grants programs stopped, the expenses are around $12k a month, so that’s years of operational costs in the multisigs. 2. Largely those assets come from the Treasury (like [this](https://etherscan.io/tx/0xf15d20de11a59e70601cbad27a5e2e35bb0ae15617151b28e4f01b5c1d67a231) or [that](https://etherscan.io/tx/0x046c8392d64148535e4f48f03a3bc3dd3e9bb1f89c98ea1bd59385887d58d5d0), which you know because [you](https://etherscan.io/address/0xfb1afa4dc069ffb47b19dbee196045d508fcd5a2) executed them), they were [converted from MANA to ETH using CoWSwap](https://etherscan.io/advanced-filter?txntype=1&tadd=0x89214c8Ca9A49E60a3bfa8e00544F384C93719b1&p=1), but they were never sent back to the Treasury? 🤔. 3. Before CoWSwap, the DAO Committee used to swap MANA to stables by [sending it to their personal wallets and swapping it on 1inch](https://etherscan.io/advanced-filter?txntype=2&tadd=0x88013D7eD946dD8292268a6FF69165a97A89a639), and no one ever raised concerns about those ‘private wallets’. So in the end these things make me question your good faith, it seems like you have double standards when it comes to taking accountability. Adding on top of that, in the last few weeks since I joined I saw you weaponize the DAO discord and the TownHall to spread your propaganda, create an ‘us vs them’ narrative, then when people actually show up to answer questions, you don’t upload the video and argue that ‘nobody missed anything’ since it didn’t fit your agenda. I don’t blame you guys for the current state of things, which can be improved a lot, but I do for not wanting to change them. We can do better. And this proposal does not address the Aragon Agent issues, but expect one coming soon to start thinking about that (super legacy, probably you can count with your fingers how many people understand how it’s set up, it’s also a set of +10 contracts to achieve the same as a regular Safe could do for the SAB. It has 3 outdated signers with unlimited access to the Treasury if the SAB sleeps for one day, and I could keep going). So if you are really concerned about the DAO and the current risks, I would love to keep the conversation going then, since it seems like all your concerns have nothing to do with **this** **proposal**. **EDIT**: formatting.
@PunkPink as someone did this failure ([800 add-ons](https://github.com/Metassive/PunkPink-add-ons)) for 24k dollars, and zero people minted it , I wouldn’t expect you to understand the consequences of any of the above, so no worries. [quote="Monotributista, post:6, topic:24653"] If you have any suggestions for the operational multisigs setup, which is under the scope of this proposal, lets talk about it. [/quote] It’s foolish to say that on the last governance proposal, where everything should already be clear and direct. [quote="dao, post:1, topic:24653"] replacements through an internal vote. [/quote] Yes, as with all the decisions that have been made internally and hidden since the establishment of the Council :clown_face: .
For those couple idiots voting **YES** on this proposal (besides the Council and their foundation friends): you’re basically handing the entire DAO treasury to a couple of clowns in the Council. 1. They can sell **+60 million MANA anytime** they feel like it, without any proposals. 2. They’ll control **+120 million MANA** coming from the vesting contract over the next 5 years. 3. They can **revoke the vesting** and get the **whole +120 million mana instantly** whenever they want. 4. They can **pay themselves whatever they want** (we already see this with Regenesis Lab , hiring whoever they want, paying whatever they want, with zero audit). 5. They can **fund any project they feel like**, with no transparency, no accountability, and no oversight — exactly like now, where nobody really knows where the money goes. 6. In total, they’ll control **180+ million MANA**, free to spend however they want. You can’t hand over the money to a couple of people and give those same people unchecked decision-making power. That’s pure stupidity. its not a DAO anymore, it’ll just be a clown show run by the Council and their friends and its name should be changed.
repost: This a YES from me and we all know why. It has been 18 MONTHS and two Proposals that was voted Yes on by the community and passed have STILL NOT BEEN ENACTED by DAO Commitee. Been trying to bring all the top NFT collections communities (Crpto Punks) (Bored Ape Yacht Club) etc to Decentraland for 3+ Years and did the impossible and got written permission which was requested by @yemel and I did. And all 30,000+ 3D GLB molds have been made dozens of times until approval to work in Decentraland and now do. But Foundation and all other committee hands are tied because DAO Committee wont enact the contracts. STILL. I honestly dont care they all get paid the $9,000 a month or whatever and if they do, good for them lol. This is just my main issue they are forcing me to care about. Them choosing to not enact contracts even when the community voted Yes to do it. I have to ask then, what is the point?? Isn’t this like by definition abuse of power? This may not pass and they will continue to keep this goin then, it is what it is and was worth the shot. I owe it to our teams hard work all these years to try and vote. But If this does end this committee then I wish them well and hope they continue to find success in whatever they do since they are talented people. But this has been our biggest hurdle for over a year now and I can see this being the only solution to get us through this 3 Year + long journey. :saluting_face: :orange_heart: https://decentraland.org/governance/proposal/?id=e76cf2ec-f030-4032-92bf-94c315237fe6 https://decentraland.org/governance/proposal/?id=89b36ab8-8121-4b42-adff-947c68c424f7
In any case, the Aragon Agent setup is not what’s being discussed in this proposal, so that’s for another discussion. I was just mentioning the irony of getting outraged by an allowance in an operational multisig, which is capped, while being OK with the current treasury setup, which has multiple people with unilateral uncapped access under a timelock. If you have any suggestions for the operational multisigs setup, which is under the scope of this proposal, lets talk about it.
I know, all that, just pointing out that the current setup is far from ideal. I think we can do better.
[quote="Monotributista, post:3, topic:24653"] there are three people (who are not the dao committee, none was voted or was disclosed publicly) [/quote] Yemel, mendez and I. mendez was added as trusted member when Eric left, Yemel was never removed. Me being in the SAB and DAO Committee doesn’t prevent other SAB or Committee members from cancelling a transaction, this doesn’t require a vote, just a single signature. Yemel and Mendez were voted in [here](https://client.aragon.org/#/dcl.eth/0x2aa9074caa11e30838caf681d34b981ffd025a8b/vote/28/) and [here](https://client.aragon.org/#/dcl.eth/0x2aa9074caa11e30838caf681d34b981ffd025a8b/vote/29/). (voted on by Esteban and on aragon, but being voted by a single person doesn't change much compared to here :upside_down:)
Hey @HPrivakos, the idea is to setup the allowance feature to cap the amount of funds that can be accessed from the multisig, to an amount that covers the monthly operations (paying the curator fees and the council members salary). It’s access to the multisig btw, not the treasury, that’s on a separate contract (the Aragon Agent). Speaking of which, the current status of the Aragon Agent is that there are three people (who are not the dao committee, none was voted or was disclosed publicly) who have full access of the $17M treasury with a 24 timelock… the SAB can block the withdrawal, yes. But you are part of those 3 signers AND also part of the SAB… rings a bell of *Quis custodiet ipsos custodes*? Anyway, seriously, we are here just trying to have a learner but tighter setup. Any feedback is welcome.
[quote="dao, post:1, topic:24653"] **Important note:** After multiple attempts to secure the continuity of one Committee member in the multisig without receiving a response [/quote] I personally was never contacted about this :slight_smile: Those multiple attempts were likely like the vast research for a Executive Director, absolutely inexistant. > Assign operator’s ‘allowance’ (using the native allowance feature of the Safe), and appoint them to perform the monthly operations Already planning to suck off more of the treasury, congrats.
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